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© La Révolution française
A Reassessment of the Abolition of
Feudalism, 1789-1793
Rafe Blaufarb
1 One of the first and most emphatically-stated goals of the French Revolution was the
abolition of feudalism. When they proclaimed that the ‘feudal regime was abolished in its
entirety’ in the decrees that issued from the momentous Night of August 4th (those of
August 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th) what exactly did the revolutionary legislators intend?1
The large number of (mostly French) historians whose scholarship has focused on feudal
abolition  have  mainly  tended  to  approach  feudalism  from  a  political-economic
perspective—as a mode of rural production and as a hierarchical social system based on
the expropriation of the fruits of peasant labour by a landowning class of lords.2 These
historians’ central concern has been with peasant refusal to comply with the impossibly
high rachat rates set in 1790 and the resistance (both active and passive) they mounted to
the payment of the non-redeemed feudal dues to which they remained legally subject.
This massive resistance, which affected most of the French countryside, ultimately forced
the Legislative Assembly and Convention to, first, moderate the Constituent Assembly’s
overly-rigorous rachat legislation and, finally, to abolish feudal dues outright, without
compensation for the ex-lords. A great mass of excellent scholarship, often focusing on
single départements or regions, has time and again confirmed this picture of the collapse
of the National Assembly’s initial approach to feudal abolition in the face of intractable
peasant resistance. There can now be no doubt that the rachat system established by the
Constituent Assembly was a complete and utter failure in the French countryside. 
2 However, the existing scholarship’s focus on the political-economic and social dimensions
of feudal abolition during the Revolution has come at a certain cost. First, it tends to
overlook the legal and even constitutional ramifications of the attempt to dismantle the
feudal system.3 Moreover, by examining only the response of the countryside to feudal
abolition, the great majority of existing scholarship ignores the question of how urban
France experienced this great change.4 Feudalism was not just a system of economic and
social  organisation, nor did it  pertain only to the countryside.  Rather,  feudalism also
provided the legal structure for virtually all land-ownership in France—both urban and
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rural—before 1789.  As  such,  the National  Assembly’s  attempt did not  only affect  the
countryside, it touched the city as well.
3 By examining the urban response to feudal abolition, this article seeks to modify the
prevailing view of the Constituent Assembly’s attempt to abolish feudalism through a
system of gradual rachat as a categorical failure. While it does not claim that this system
was a great success, even in urban spaces, it does suggest that the rachat system did meet
with a certain degree of acceptance and experienced higher degrees of participation than
in the countryside.
4 By its decrees of 3-9 May 1790, the Constituent Assembly implemented a system of rachat
by  which  tenants  could  theoretically  purchase  and  thus  extinguish  the  feudal  dues
imposed on  their  properties.5 Under  this  system,  tenants  were  required  to  continue
paying their feudal dues until they effected a rachat. However, the rates of those feudal
dues were set very high—as much as twenty-five times the annual payment tenants were
obliged to make. Consequently, very few tenants were wealthy enough to afford a rachat,
so most simply stopped paying their dues.6 Faced with this overwhelming resistance, the
Legislative  Assembly  relaxed the  Constituent’s  uncompromising  rachat legislation  (18
June and 16-25 August  1792).  But  even this  was  not  enough.  On July  17th,  1793,  the
Convention finally abolished feudal dues without compensation. Thus, after three years
of  dysfunction,  noncompliance,  and  sometimes  violent  resistance,  the  Constituent
Assembly’s system of rachat thus came to an inglorious end.
5 To treat the rachat episode as an abject failure distorts the early years of the Revolution in
at least two important ways. First, it tends to portray the deputies as incompetent or,
worse,  secretly  committed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  feudal  property  regime  in  a
disguised form.7 This hardly comports with the vigorous measures they took—noble and
non-noble  deputies  alike—to  abolish  seigneurial  justice,  serfdom,  and  all  the  other
trappings of the feudal system. Second, it obscures the extent to which certain propertied
social groups—although certainly not the peasantry—embraced the deputies’ approach to
feudal abolition and took part in the rachat programme. While peasants categorically
rejected the Constituent Assembly’s approach to feudal abolition, other groups with more
means  (nobles  and  non-nobles  alike)  did  not.  Given  this,  we  need  to  consider  the
possibility that the deputies had always envisioned rachat as a programme for propertied
urban-dwelling elites, rather than for the rural poor. And if this is the case, can we really
consider the Constituent Assembly’s approach to feudal abolition a failure? It surely was a
terrible political misjudgement, but was not necessarily a manifestation of incompetence
or disingenuousness. To a degree that historians have not recognised, rachat did what it
was designed to do—to give people of means a way to liberate their properties from
feudal superiorities.
6 The conventional view of feudal abolition as an abject failure is based on two questionable
assumptions. The first is that the Constituent Assembly expected the rachat system to
complete the process of feudal abolition rapidly. The second is that the failure of rachat in
the countryside can be extrapolated to the urban setting. The first of these assumptions
can be dispatched quickly.  The members of  the Feudal  Committee who designed the
rachat system never  expected  it  to  work  quickly.  Instead,  they  assumed  that  feudal
abolition would proceed at the same pace as the real estate market. They anticipated that
property-holders  would  only  opt  to  effect  a  rachat in  conjunction  with  property
transactions, in order to avoid the heavy property mutation fee, the droit de lods. As early
as September 1789, Tronchet made this explicit in a speech to the Assembly.
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We can foresee that the rachat of feudal and censual rights will not proceed rapidly;
few property owners will want to diminish their resources by a rachat to free their
holdings from a charge [the lods] that will not bear on them as long as they retain
their property. It will be the instant of alienation that will provoke a rachat. The
buyer  will  only  want  to  buy  on  the  condition  that  the  seller  delivers  him  the
property free [of all feudal dues]. The seller will feel the full weight of the current
transfer free…he will want to avoid the effect of his past indifference at the
moment he wants to sell.8
7 The  real  estate  market  would  be  the  engine  of  feudal  abolition, and  the  Assembly
understood and approved of this. Given that landed properties generally changed hands
only once every fifty to eighty years, Tronchet informed the Assembly, feudal abolition
would  be  a  decades-long  process.  The  deputies  neither  expected  nor  intended  the
‘prompt abolition of the feudal regime,’ as is generally assumed.9
8 A much stronger case for the failure of the rachat system can be made by highlighting the
massive  resistance  of  the  French  peasantry.10 The  Feudal  Committees  of  both  the
Constituent and Legislative Assemblies were deluged by reports that the peasants had
stopped paying their dues, particularly the heavy payment in kind known as the champart
. Their resistance generally took the form of silent, massive refusal, but at times could
rise to the level of threats, violence, and, in a handful of departments, actual insurrection.
On occasion, local authorities mobilised national guards and even regular army troops,
but more often they looked on helplessly, passively, or even complicitly. Officialdom was
even known to lead the resistance, as in May 1790, when the municipal councils of four
villages in the Yonne département joined forces to demand that their lords surrender the
titles upon which their rights to collect the champart were founded.11
9 Repeated attempts were made to restore order in the countryside and get the peasants to
pay their dues. Departmental, district, and municipal officials of the new regime all
appealed for compliance. To cite one example, the departmental administration of the Lot
département published  a  proclamation  on  August  30 th,  1790  calling  on  the  people  to
‘respect individual properties as well  as national ones’  by paying ‘rents,  censives,  and
other dues which have not been abolished but rather declared subject to rachat.’12 Village
officials joined the effort. By his own account, the mayor of Brueyleroi (Loiret département
) regularly harangued the inhabitants after Sunday mass to continue paying their feudal
dues until rachat.13 The clergy also joined in the effort to obtain compliance.14 Even royal
authority was brought to bear, notably in July 1790 when the National Assembly asked the
royal council  to quash the anti-feudal deliberation of the four village councils in the
Yonne département.15 That the National Assembly would invite the King to strike down a
resolution taken by elected, municipal officials shows just how worried the deputies had
become about the situation in the countryside.
10 The Constituent Assembly itself penned address after address, urging compliance with
the laws on rachat and the abolition of feudalism. The last of these, described by one
historian as the Feudal Committee’s ‘political testament’,16 was Merlin’s Instruction of
June 15th, 1791.17 Reiterating the sacrality and inviolability of property, it attributed the
troubles  in the countryside to the ignorance of  the peasantry and weakness of  local
authorities. If the disorders did not cease, it warned, the Constitution ‘would die in its
cradle.’  Even  non-feudal  property-holders  should  be  concerned  because,  unless  the
peasants were forced to honour their obligations,  the ‘attack against the property of
incorporeal domains might one day strike those of landed ones.’ It was necessary to treat
the dues-evaders as  ‘rebels  against  the law,  as  usurpers of  others’  property,  and use
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armed force against them without flinching.’ It is impossible to know what would have
happened had this tough talk been put into action. The King’s Flight less than one week
later ended whatever hopes Merlin and his colleagues had of obtaining rural compliance
through coercion.18
11 There are isolated examples of peasants availing themselves of the laws on rachat. For
example, on June 22nd, 1792, ten peasants of the Gascon village of Cadillac repurchased
their champarts, undoubtedly in anticipation of the approaching harvest.19 But this was a
rare exception. From peasant resistance to the desperation of the National Assembly, all
signs point to the failure of the rachat system in the countryside.
12 But feudalism was not a purely rural phenomenon. Rather feudalism was the universal
framework  of  property  holding  in  which  virtually  all  real  estate  was  enmeshed.
Accordingly, most urban properties were also subject to feudal lordship. Urban feudalism
covered a much smaller physical space than its rural counterpart. But to a certain extent,
this was compensated by the greater value per square meter of urban property.20 Another
difference between the two feudalisms is that urban lords, in contrast to rural seigneurs,
were rarely individuals.  Instead, urban lordships were primarily held by ecclesiastical
institutions and (to a lesser extent) the royal domain. When the National Assembly took
over the holdings of the Church and Crown, the dues generated by these urban lordships
became biens  nationaux.  If  we integrate  this  urban dimension of  feudalism into  the
overall  picture,  the impression of  unmitigated failure  we get  by looking only  at  the
countryside becomes difficult  to  sustain.  It  is  to  the unexplored urban dimension of
feudal abolition that we now turn.
*
* *
13 The extent of nationalised ex-ecclesiastic and domanial lordships was very great. Before
1789, the royal domain claimed lordship over all immediate fiefs of the Crown. Although
its physical holdings were few, essentially palaces and forests, the domanial lordships
formed a significant mass of incorporeal property—cens,  ground rents, lods,  and other
dues. The properties of the Church, however, dwarfed those of the Crown. Before 1789,
the Church was the single largest lord in France and was especially prominent in the
urban  space.  Few  cities  lacked  ecclesiastical  lordships.  In  Aix-en-Provence,  whose
population was only 20,000, the archbishopric and over 30 other religious establishments
possessed 1,590  cens,  ground rents,  and other  annual  dues.  Together  each year  they
generated 24,150 livres and approximately 16.5 metric tons of grain for the Church. 21 In
Marseille,  which  was  much  more  populous  but  possessed  only  a  bishopric,  over  50
religious institutions owned 1,165 incorporeal properties—mostly ground rents on urban
dwellings. Their annual yield was 77,316 livres cash and payments in kind of over 12
metric tons of grain, as well as a quantity of oil.22 In Limoges, the bishop claimed lordship
over more than 700 urban properties and many rural sub-fiefs. These, in turn, claimed
lordship over many hundreds of properties.23 Ecclesiastical lordships were so ubiquitous
that they were the subject of a manual published just before the Revolution. In addition
to its ‘domains, ground rents, and similar kinds of property,’ the work explained, the
Church also owned ‘seigneuries,’ ‘proprietary superiorities’ (directes), and ‘rights attached
to the exercise of public power.’24 All these ecclesiastical possessions became national
properties in November 1789.25
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14 Although sometimes termed ‘national ex-feudal dues,’ the rents generated by these ex-
ecclesiastical  and  domanial  lordships  were  more  commonly  described  as  ‘national
incorporeal dues’ during the revolutionary decade. Under Napoleon, they would change
names  again,  becoming  simply  ‘national  rents,’  a  title  they  retained  well  into  the
nineteenth century. In addition to those which had been truly feudal, they also included a
great quantity of non-feudal incorporeal goods. In particular, there were many perpetual
ground rents. Like those in the hands of individuals, many were enunciated in contracts
containing  feudal  language.  In  addition,  the  Church possessed  certain  types  of  non-
feudal, perpetual rents specific to it. These included obituary rents, established by pious
bequests to fund prayers for the souls of the departed, and mass-endowing rents (rentes de
fondation de messe), created for masses to be sung on certain saints’ days. Although the
National Assembly snapped these up along with the rest of the Church’s endowment, it
did not  assume responsibility for  the religious services  they had been established to
support. Far from it. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy so decimated the clergy that
many parishes no longer had personnel to say endowed prayers and masses. And in some
cases, the revolutionaries sold as biens nationaux the very chapels to which these rents
were attached. Yet, the state continued to demand that the debtors of these pious rents
keep paying them. This angered descendants of the original benefactors.26 But, in the eyes
of the revolutionaries, all of these types of properties were neither more nor less than
national rents, regardless of the purpose for which they had been created.
15 It is impossible today to know the exact value of the former domanial and ecclesiastical
rents.  The revolutionaries  themselves  were  not  sure.  Their  initial  estimates  varied,
ranging from as little as 3 million to as much as 22.5 million livres in annual revenue. 27
Any supplement to national revenue was not to be scoffed at, but the real fiscal potential
of the national rents lay elsewhere. As ex-feudal dues and ground rents, they represented
an annual interest payment on the capital value of the properties on which they had been
established. If the owners of those properties could be induced to redeem the capital of
those dues and rents through the rachat system, this could raise a very large sum indeed.
Again,  estimates varied,  ranging from 200 to 500 million livres.28 Whatever the exact
figure,  it  was clear to everybody that the national rents could go a long way toward
paying down the debt if converted into a capital sum through rachat.
16 As nationalised, ex-ecclesiastical feudal properties destined to help pay down the debt, it
required cumbersome joint meetings of the multiple legislative committees concerned
with these areas—the domanial, ecclesiastical, fiscal, and others—to design a mechanism
for their rachat. At one juncture, no fewer than seven committees were meeting together
for that purpose.29 A complete system emerged only piecemeal from this process. In their
report  of  April  10th,  1790,  domanial  committee  members  Barère  and  Enjubault  had
proposed entrusting rachat operations to the locally elected departmental authorities. 30
Their recommendation was partly incorporated into the general law on the rachat of
feudal dues which was passed on May 3rd, 1790. That law mandated that departmental
authorities would handle the rachat of ex-ecclesiastical dues, but did not state who would
receive the rachat of those of royal-domanial origin. The doubt was soon lifted, however,
by a supplementary law which assigned responsibility for the ex-domanial rights to the
Régie des Domaines, a consortium of financiers who had leased the right to collect these
fees before the Revolution and whose lease had not yet expired.31 To facilitate the rachat
of  the  national  incorporeal  dues,  another  law  was  passed  on  November  14th,  1790
permitting  individuals  to  buy  back  the  dues  they  owed the  nation piece-by-piece—a
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facility many petitioners had sought unsuccessfully from the Feudal Committee for those
ex-feudal dues held by private individuals.32 Although several changes would be made,
the most important being the transfer of authority over the former royal-domanial rights
to a newly-created administration, the Régie de l’Enregistrement,  these laws determined
how the rachat of national feudal dues would proceed.
17 The rachat of national rents and dues, both feudal and non-feudal, was vigorous in urban
settings.  In  Aix,  more  than  half  (283  of  407)  of  the  rachats conducted  between  the
beginning of operations in June 1790 and the implementation of the law of July 14th, 1793
had national dues as their object.33 These rachats netted the nation 270,000 livres. Things
happened on a grander scale in Marseille, where 744 rachats raised over 950,000 livres. All
but  a  handful  of  these  were  of  national  dues,  which was  not  surprising  since  most
property in the city had been held under ecclesiastical or royal lordships.34 Rachats appear
to have proceeded at a healthy clip in Paris as well, although the loss of the registers in
which overall figures were recorded make it impossible to offer comprehensive figures
for that city. Excellent records for the Abbey of Sainte-Geneviève, however, survive. They
indicate that between December 1790 and February 1792, rachats of national dues raised
over 8,000 livres in revenue for the state.35 Registers also survive for the first, second, and
third arrondissements (about one-third of the city), and these only concern rachats carried
out between November 17th, 1791 and October 8th, 1793. Nonetheless, they contain 139
rachats for a total of about 550,000 livres.36 Although their records are missing for the
period after June 8th, 1792, the city archives of Lyon tell a similar story, with 247 rachats
valued at  a  little  less  than 600,000 livres.37 Finally,  the western city of  Tours,  whose
records have survived for  the entire period,  but  do not  indicate the sums of  money
involved, had 307 rachats.38 Rachat seems to have worked more smoothly in urban spaces
than the traditional narrative of failure suggests. 
18 Urban interest in the rachat of national rents may have had a spill-over effect into the
countryside, since much rural land was held by city-dwellers. The city of Rouen provides
a suggestive illustration. Between November 11th, 1790 and September 27th, 1791, the local
authorities received 32 requests for the rachat of nationalised, ex-ecclesiastical rents. Of
these,  about  two-thirds  (21)  concerned  agricultural  land,  one-third  (10)  houses  and
gardens  in  the  city  itself,  and one was  an unspecified  rent.39 At  the  same time,  the
‘country districts’ of Lyon effected 144 rachats, netting the state approximately 200,000
livres.40 Rural  districts  close  to  major  urban  centres  also  experienced  a  number  of
national rachats. In the rural district of Jouques in the hinterland of Aix, 5 of the 10 rachat
s effected there between February 28th, 1791 and November 16th, 1793 were of national
dues, raising over 825 livres.41 In the district of Gardanne, however, the proportion was
reversed:  between  April  28th,  1791  and  September  15th,  1793,  only  6  of  19  rachats
concerned national dues.42
19 Who took advantage of the facility of rachat in the urban context? The prevailing view of
rachat, based solely on rural evidence, holds that rates were set so high that all but the
very  rich  were  excluded  from  its  benefits.  Georges  Lefebvre,  the  father  of  French
Revolutionary peasant  studies,  claimed that  only ‘nobles  and bourgeois’  were wealthy
enough to take part, and, even then, only in limited numbers.43 One local monograph, on
the rural department of the Haute-Vienne, found that fully 40% of the rare rachats in that
region  were  conducted  by  feudal  lords.44 These  conclusions  seem  plausible  for  the
countryside and are basically sound for urban sites as well. But they need a bit of nuance.
While wealthy elites (Lefebvre’s nobles and bourgeois) accounted for the great majority of
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those taking advantage of  rachat to free their  urban properties  of  feudal  dues,  more
modest social strata were not entirely absent. In his study of the social characteristics of
those who effected rachats in Bordeaux, André Ferradou found that people ranging from
deputies, venal office holders, lords, and rich merchants, on the one hand, to stevedores,
day labourers, and artisans, on the other, effected rachats.45 Ferradou’s findings are very
suggestive, but he was unable to offer any conclusion about the relative weight of these
different social categories within the overall group of those engaged in rachat.  This is
because in Bordeaux, as in most French towns and cities, the registers in which rachats
were supposed to have been recorded were burned in 1793 for containing feudal terms.
20 Fortunately, the registers of Aix-en-Provence survived.46 Although Aix was smaller and
less commercial than Bordeaux, the range of social groups which took advantage of rachat
there  was  somewhat  similar  to  what Ferradou  found  for  the  great  Atlantic  port.
Approximately half (194 of 407) of the rachats recorded in the registers include some
indication of social status.
 
Social composition of rachats in Aix-en-Provence47
Social Category Number % of Total
Deputy of the 2nd Estate 1 0.5
Magistrate of Sovereign Court 7 3.5
Seigneur 6 3.1
Bourgeois or Propriétaire 14 7.2
Négociant or Marchand 46 23.5
Lawyer or Notary 18 9.2
Doctor 6 3.1
Local municipal or judicial officer 11 5.6
Military officer 3 1.5
Guild master 13 6.7
Artist or architect 4 2.1
Priest 4 2.1
Artisan or laborer 41 21
Agricultural (from landed peasant to urban gardener) 21 10.7
Totals 194 100%
21 This table  indicates  a  somewhat  broader  social  spectrum  than  nobles  and  bourgeois
participated  in  urban  rachat operations.  While  the  truly  elite  categories  (deputy,
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magistrate, and seigneur) together represent about 7% of the total, those of the wealthy (
bourgeois,  proprietor, merchant) an additional 31%, and the professions and municipal
officers as much as 25%, middling social categories account for perhaps one-third of the
total number of rachats. At least for the urban population, rachat was more accessible than
the historiography suggests.
*
* *
22 It  would be incorrect to replace the excessively gloomy traditional assessment of the
abolition of feudalism with an overly bright one. The system designed by Merlin and
Tronchet was politically unwise, in that it did not make sufficient allowance for the actual
financial situation of the great majority of the peasantry. And it exhibited a degree of
juridical rigour—even hair-splitting—that was imprudent given the combustible political
context of the time. Fear, distrust, and instability clearly hindered the rachat operations,
fatally so in the countryside. Many worried that counterrevolution might prevail and
restore feudalism in its wake, thus rendering rachat a pointless waste of money. Others
dreaded that peasant resistance would scuttle the rachat system, either by overthrowing
it directly or by causing so much trouble that the Assembly would be forced to make
drastic revisions to it. In fact, the laws on rachat were constantly changing, injecting an
element  of  unpredictability  into  the  mix  that  discouraged  speculations  of  all  sorts.
Nonetheless, in spite of all this, more people participated in the rachat system than the
historiography has recognised. These people tended to be city-dwellers of the middle and
upper  classes.  Their  participation  in  rachat constituted  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the
Revolution in much the same way as buying a national property.48 Like such purchases,
rachats were investments in the revolution. Both the sums and the people involved could
be quite substantial. When someone like the sieur Clappier-Vauvenargues, from a leading
family  of  the Provençal  nobility,  paid nearly  13,000 livres  to  free  his  ‘former fief  of
Vauvenargues’  from the  overlordship  of  the  ex-royal,  now national,  domain,  he  was
gambling that neither counterrevolution, nor radicalisation, nor jacquerie would render
his investment vain.49 He was expressing in a very material way his faith that the National
Assembly  would  not  retreat  from  the  commitment  it  had  made  in  1789  to  abolish
feudalism with compensation.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper reassesses the French Revolutionary abolition of feudalism. The existing scholarship
on the subject has been primarily concerned to measure the socio-economic impact of feudal
abolition and has concluded that the Constituent Assembly’s attempt to end the feudal regime
through a  system of  gradual  rachat was  a  failure.  This  paper  breaks  from this  conventional
approach by taking a legal and institutional approach to the problem of feudal abolition and
concludes that, while the rachat programme did indeed fail in the countryside, where peasants
most definitely did not use rachat vis-a-vis their particular lords, it was a great success in the
towns and cities of France. There, urban bourgeoisie indeed made use of the rachat system to free
their properties from the emprise of formerly ecclesiastical (after December 1789, nationalized)
feudal lordships.
Cet  article  procède  à  une  réévaluation  de  l’abolition  du  féodalisme  durant  la  Révolution
française. Les études existantes sur le sujet se sont concentrées essentiellement sur la mesure de
l’impact socio-économique de l’abolition féodale et ont conclu que la tentative de l’Assemblée
constituante de mettre fin au régime féodal au travers d’un système de rachat graduel a été un
échec. Cet article se détache de cette approche conventionnelle en abordant l’angle juridique et
institutionnel du problème de l’abolition féodale et en conclut que, si le programme de rachat a
bel et bien échoué dans les campagnes, où les paysans ne firent définitivement pas usage du
rachat vis-à-vis de leurs seigneurs particuliers, il  fut un réel succès dans les villes et cités de
France. Dans ces dernières, la bourgeoisie urbaine utilisa en effet le système des rachats pour
libérer  leurs  propriétés  de  l’emprise  des  anciennes  seigneuries  féodales  ecclésiastiques
(nationalisées après décembre 1789).
INDEX
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